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Abstract 
Political institutions in democratically orientated political systems interact with 
interest organisations to enhance the legitimacy of their policies, whether 
through greater acceptance of them (inputs) or to enhance efficiencies 
(outputs).  The remoteness from civil society of transnational organisations 
makes them particularly reliant upon interactions with interest groups and the 
like, reinforced by shared outlooks and background of personnel.  Transnational 
organisations also use interest groups as political messengers to national 
governments, as sources of political support for their policies, and as surrogate 
agents for ‘civil society’.  The use of interest groups for legitimacy purposes, 
and the extent of dependence upon them, makes public confidence in 
exchanges between political institutions and interest groups of critical 
importance, and international organisations therefore have systems in place 
which ensure a presence for NGOs through funding regimes, and which 
regulate exchanges for transparency and formal equality of access.  Beyond 
this there is variation, between poles of corporatist style accreditation for an 
elite few through to pluralist regimes founded upon competition between a 
teeming population of interest groups.   
The balance of EU competencies towards the regulatory type demands highly 
technical input, and predicts underlying interest group politics.  The European 
Union has an elaborated system of interest representation which is pluralist in 
character.  An underlying regulatory structure has been developed by the 
European Commission which stimulates competition between groups and 
nurtures constituencies of supporters.  The extent of its funding regime for 
NGOs is remarkable. The Commission has also developed instruments to equip 
interest groups to perform accountability functions on political institutions 
otherwise missing from consensually orientated political systems.  A series of 
procedures which structure interaction between EU political institutions and 
interest organisations have emerged since the turn of the century which 
compare favourably with measures in place in the member states.  These 
procedures are informed by agendas of both ‘better regulation’ and of 
‘participative legitimacy’.   
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Introduction 
Whilst most developed political systems have substantial interactions with 
stakeholders, the EU is remarkable in a high degree of dependence upon 
organised interests to achieve systemic goals, manifested by a high 
degree of EU funding for NGOs.  Before examining specificities of the EU 
system of interest representation, a first section of this chapter 
contextualises a set of more generally applicable issues about the role of 
interest groups in political participation. This helps to place the factors 
informing the extent of EU systemic dependencies upon organised 
interests in the EU political system, as well as the principles which inform 
the instruments used by EU political institutions to structure their 
relationship with interest organisations.     
Typologies of interest group roles in political participation 
Participation in the political decision making of democratic systems can be 
bifurcated between two poles.  In one pole, participation is viewed as 
undermining the role of political institutions designed to represent the 
common interest, through the potential to skew decision making in favour 
of special interests (Schumpeter, 1943; Majone, 1996).  This outlook is 
commonly found among civil society in southern Europe and in central and 
eastern European countries, where ‘lobbying’ is viewed in pejorative 
terms, and where even the contribution of NGOs is seen in terms more 
sceptical than positive (Eurobarometer Flash, 2013).  At the opposite end 
of the spectrum is Pateman’s ‘no democracy without participation’ 
(Pateman, 1970), a tradition of supplementing representative channels in 
which ‘stakeholder participation’ is seen as an element of ‘good 
governance’, aimed at enhancing output (effectiveness) and input 
(participative) legitimacy.  Stakeholder participation is commonplace in a 
variety of territories across the globe, where instruments of consultation 
inform regimes of ‘better regulation’ as well as the concept that 
participation in itself provides for better acceptance through knowledge of 
the reasons which inform subsequent choices made by political 
institutions.  Instruments for consultation can also provide the space for 
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political institutions to ‘divide and rule’ by acquiring a wide range of 
diverging viewpoints which are then presented in follow-up consultation 
reports.  Stakeholder participation ranges from corporatist traditions in 
Germanic and Nordic countries, to Anglo-US pluralist traditions (from 
where the word ‘lobbying’ originates) where a teeming population of 
interest groups are encouraged to act as checks on the power of each 
other, as well as upon the state.  In this tradition, any form of 
engagement – including critical perspectives - is open to interpretation as 
support for the wider political system.  Checks on excessive powers – 
whether by states or by other forces – thus becomes a democratic 
function.  Participation in a ‘market-place of ideas,’ where argument and 
advocacy is subjected to scrutiny, tests of robustness, and counter-
argument, is interpreted as contributing to foundations of legitimacy.  
Political institutions might undertake measures to stimulate the breadth of 
participating interests, such as funding for NGOs, justified on the basis of 
enabling a counterweight to business, creating a ready constituency of 
support for political institutions for policy proposals likely to encounter 
opposition by entrenched interests, and providing a flow of information 
into the political system.  Information can be of a political nature in 
testing whether legislative proposals are likely to survive to become law, 
and technical for making proposals workable or to provide street-level 
feedback which demonstrate policy failure.   
In international organisations, interest groups are often used as 
surrogates for ‘civil society’ and agents to assist with policy delivery 
(Mercer 2002, Ottaway 2011).  Because international organisations are 
adrift from civil society, interest groups act as proxies and surrogate 
democratic mechanisms, playing a de-facto role of ‘unofficial opposition’ 
within a political system lacking a system of government and opposition, 
popular parties or an engaged public.  International organisations need to 
regulate because of the extent of their reliance upon ‘participation by 
lobby groups’ coupled with the degree to which this is open to pejorative 
interpretation, as well as to establish the ‘rules of the game’ for  political 
participation.  This can range from accreditation arrangements resembling 
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corporatist structures, through to a series of rules aimed at ensuring a 
‘level playing field’ of competition between groups and access to political 
institutions, much in the way in which ‘free’ markets require rules to 
structure market exchange.   
The EU system of interest representation 
The EU system is contextualised by the needs of international 
organisations as reviewed above, but is distinct in its pluralist traditions 
with underlying regulation to ensure structured competition between a 
teeming population of groups.  This differs from the United Nations, World 
Health Organisation, and Council of Europe, where accreditation 
arrangements restrict access to the political system to an elite set of 
interest groups.  In the EU system there is explicit discourse which 
excludes accreditation arrangements on grounds of anti-elitism (JTRS, 
2012).  This is a similar outlook to perspectives which place the principal 
emphasis upon the density of interest group populations as countervailing 
forces and sources of debate in a public space, where it makes little sense 
to erect obstacles to group formation through regulatory requirements 
such as ‘representativeness’ or accreditation (Kohler Koch, 2010).  The 
underlying regulation is instead articulated on the basis of ‘transparency 
for public legitimacy’ (Kallas, 2005), through a ‘Transparency Register’ 
(dating from 2011, but with earlier predecessor schemes) because, in the 
words of the scheme, 
‘European institutions interaction with citizen’s associations, NGOs, 
businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions, think 
tanks, etc. is constant, legitimate and necessary for the quality of 
democracy, for their capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching 
needs and reality.  Citizens have a right to expect this process to be 
transparent and to take place in compliance with the law as well as in 
due respect of ethical principles, avoiding undue pressure, 
illegitimate or privileged access to information or to decision makers’ 
(JTRS, 2013). 
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With 28 member states, EU decision making can only be founded upon 
consensus.  Consensually orientated decision making systems are in 
particular need of an opposition, and interest groups in a system where 
there are three decision making institutions but no system of ‘government 
and opposition’ provide a ready constituency to fulfil this task.  Policy-
makers at an early stage of preparing policy initiatives need signals about 
how policy proposals are likely to be received by governments in the 
member states.  In the EU system, the regulatory character of much 
policy making enhances the role of interest groups through their capacity 
to act as support mechanisms for political institutions with supranational 
outlooks.  The European Commission has long stimulated the formation of 
groups capable of supporting its regulatory policy proposals in the face of 
entrenched opposition by producer interests (Young, 2010), and 
ultimately for the development of European integration itself.  Most of the 
Commission services administer budget lines with funding streams aimed 
at supporting NGOs, either by providing core operating grants or through 
project instruments broadly aimed at underpinning European integration.  
NGOs which receive a grant from EU political institutions obtain, on 
average, 43% of their income in this way (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013). 
The most intensive relationship with interest groups involves the European 
Commission because of its roles and interests in policy formulation and 
implementation, coupled with its lack of resources relative to the functions 
it undertakes.  The European Parliament’s role as co-legislator also makes 
it hungry for expertise, and for allies.  Because of their interests and 
difficulties in connecting with civil society, these institutions are somewhat 
reliant upon interest groups as surrogates for civil society.  Various 
interpretations place the role of organised interests in the EU system 
somewhere between participatory governance and attempts to stimulate a 
European public sphere (Heidbreder, 2012).  In a quest for a variety of 
different types of legitimacies, an infrastructure has arisen to formalise 
exchanges with ‘interested parties’ using devices commonly found 
elsewhere.  The reliance upon ‘outside interests’ is evident in a variety of 
Commission communications of varying status dating from 1992 
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(European Commission, 1992; 1997; 2000, 2001), in which the 
Commission progressively seeks, in the title of the first of these, ‘an open 
and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest 
groups’.  The last of these, the 2001 White Paper on Governance, was a 
landmark change in which a drive towards participation was intended to 
enhance the legitimacy of European governance as well as its 
effectiveness (Heidbreder, 2012).  This led to the development of a 
system of procedures for the involvement of ‘interested parties’ (a term 
often used by the European Commission to denote a wider reach than 
interest groups), in which civil society is both an active policy collaborator 
in governance and an agent of a European public sphere (ibid.): 
‘The Commission talks about "interest representatives" and 
"representing interests" because these are neutral terms, in keeping 
with its positive approach to the activity of representing interests. It 
uses them in preference to "lobbyist" and "lobbying" which for some 
people carry negative connotations’ (European Commission, 2013). 
This outlook reflects a concern with democratic legitimacy, rather than an 
instrumental focus upon symbolic consultation or upon simply satisfying 
its information needs.  Thus, procedures for access to documents, for 
instance, empower requesters to acquire documentation from EU 
institutions and enhance the ability of civil society to act as systemic 
accountability agents, but in practice require interest organisations with 
sufficient resources for full time staff with EU policy knowledge to trawl 
through registers of documents on Europa. Whilst a variety of different 
services of the Commission have their own structures to communicate 
with interest organisations, they operate within a system of minimal 
standards applicable across the Commission.  The sections which follow 
review the details of these schemes and assess their orientation.  The 
European Parliament has relatively few rules to structure its interaction 
with interest organisations, other than an access pass scheme within the 
framework of the Transparency Register, an instrument reviewed in 
further detail later in this chapter.   
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The Transparency Register has been the focus of globalised lobby 
regulation activists seeking the development of ever higher regulatory 
standards orientated towards instruments in the USA as a benchmark 
standard.  They are led by a professionalised social movement 
organisation which emerged from the counter-globalisation tradition and 
arrived on the Brussels scene after the ‘Battle of Seattle’.  There is now a 
family of 80 organisations combining ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ orientations, 
sourcing substantial funds to employ a large number of staff working from 
the large (4000m) purpose renovated ‘Mundo-B’ eco-building in Brussels 
with shared facilities (conference centre, café, etc) and within easy 
walking distance of the European Parliament.  Their presence is both 
cause and consequence of a shift from regulatory EU competencies (in which 
there is a premium upon technical information) towards those which have 
more salience in electoral politics.  Nonetheless, virtually all types of 
legislative policy making requires expert resources, and the Parliament’s 
now almost complete set of powers as co-legislator enable it to make its 
mark.  The expert resources available in the European Parliament to 
support its legislative work do not match those of the European 
Commission, with the inevitable result that a number of amendments 
sponsored by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) bear the 
hallmarks of lobbying organisations.  Those which are intensively involved 
in preparing the parliament’s political response to legislative proposals – 
the Rapporteurs and their shadows from other parties, all drawn from the 
lead committee(s), use the pluralistic forces of interest groups more 
systematically by checking out technical information with opposed sets of 
stakeholders, or by using groups as political messengers and supporters. 
The size of the population of organisations which lobby EU institutions is 
subject to political contestation by lobby regulation activists.  The 
Transparency Register seems to cover around three-quarters of the 
population of EU business related organisations lobbying the EU, and 60% 
of NGOs (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013).  The Register also contains a 
sizeable segment with nothing to do with lobbying EU institutions but 
instead use it as free publicity space.  There were 3577 organisations on 
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the Register at the start of 2013 which identified ‘European’ as among 
their territorial level of interest represented (Greenwood and Dreger, 
2013).  Around two-thirds of these (64.76% - 2316) were business 
related organisations, and one quarter (23.04% - 824) were NGOs.  Of 
the constituency of 3577, 2095 had an address (whether main or 
supplementary) in Brussels; when those with an address in neighbour 
countries to Belgium are included, the total reaches 2240.  This seems to 
be the core of organisations lobbying EU institutions (Greenwood and 
Dreger, 2013).  At the start of 2013, there were 1,179 organisations with 
at least one individual accredited to the European Parliament, accounting 
for 2,733 individuals.i 
The most recent measure developed by the EU aimed at connecting with 
civil society is the 2012 European Citizens’ Initiative.  This agenda-setting 
measure seeks to develop a European public sphere, representing 
something of a break from the past by seeking it separate it from interest 
groups.  It insists upon the creation of ‘Citizens’ Committees’ as 
organising agents rather than interest groups, in which one million citizens 
from at least seven member states can request the Commission to bring 
forward a legislative proposal.  The measure has mobilised a number of 
campaigns from the member-state which are clearly set apart from the 
Brussels circuit.  However, at the time of writing, only one of these looks 
set to pass the one-million threshold within the permitted twelve month 
time frame, a measure backed by an interest group organised at EU level.  
Once again, the systemic dependence upon interest organisations is 
emphasised. 
Impact Assessments with Consultation 
Impact assessments (IA) are used by the European Commission to justify 
legislative proposals in concept and detail to civil society.  These are 
informed by consultations with a wide range of outside interests, 
collecting detailed input to firm up policy options and sharpen legislative 
proposals, as well as attempting to acquire broader legitimacy.  A 
structure of procedures has emerged to ensure that everyone has a 
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chance to make their voice heard.  The origins of these can be traced back 
to a High Level working group in 1992, which had complained of 
inadequate and intermittent information flows as well as ad-hoc 
consultation, leading to an unpredictable and confusing process, and a 
wider public which was ill-informed (Sutherland Report, 1992).  This had 
created a situation where stakeholders needed to locate the relevant 
policy-makers and develop their own bilateral relations with them, 
requiring resources for intensive networking.  The Secretariat General's 
response, ‘An Open and Structured Dialogue between the Commission and 
Special Interest Groups’, sought to 'place these relations on a more 
formalised footing which will make them more transparent for the benefit 
of all concerned’ as well as 'broadening participation in the preparation of 
Commission proposals' (European Commission, 1992, p.1).   The 2001 
White Paper on Governance (WPG) developed this latter participatory 
theme  'to connect Europe with its citizens' (European Commission, 2001, 
p.3) through 'better involvement and more openness' (ibid., p.4).  The 
WPG also has discourse about how to manage participation, noting how 
'consultation helps the Commission and other Institutions to arbitrate 
between competing claims' (European Commission, 2001, p.15).   
Whilst the orientation of the WPG was more towards input legitimacy, 
another important strand of contributory thinking emerged which shaped 
the information exchange regime between the Commission and outside 
interests. The High Level Mandelkern Report of 2001 was established in 
response to member state criticisms of the quality of policy initiatives 
from the Commission (Radaelli, 2004), and whose recommendations came 
downstream in a regime for impact assessment embedded within a frame 
of ‘better regulation’.  Impact Assessments are presented on the 
Commission web site as a means to ‘guide the policy-making process 
through an open analysis of the options and provides a discipline to 
ensure that economic, social and environmental factors are fully taken 
into account’ (European Commission, 2012a). 
Thus, the WPG concerns with input legitimacy were mixed with the 
Mandelkern concern with output legitimacy.  Both of these aspirations are 
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clearly evident in the detail of the regimes structuring information flows 
between the Commission and outside interests, in which a ‘system’ is 
clearly visible for the entire process of interactions.  In 2002 a series of 
standards were introduced for the use of expertise, and for consultation, 
and which became embedded in a regime of Impact Assessments 
introduced in 2003 aimed at ensuring that policy options were informed 
by a sound evidence base.  These procedures have developed through a 
series of incremental reforms, each reflecting predominant concerns at the 
time with output or/and input legitimacy.  Whilst the procedures are 
required practice and have become standard policy norms, they are not 
underpinned by legal provisions, although the extent to which they might 
be viewed as enforceable in the event of a test case before the Court of 
Justice remains an open question (Tanasescu, 2009).   
Legislative notification and Impact Assessments 
The first step in the legislative process is for all new initiatives to be 
announced in advance through the  annual publication (available on the 
internet) of a forward ‘Commission Legislative Work Programme’ (CLWP), 
ensuring that knowledge of future regulatory initiatives is provided in 
sufficient time for actors not among the 'usual suspects' in Brussels to 
enter the process.   The CLWP notification includes an ‘Impact Assessment 
Roadmap’, within which the proposed means of consultation is laid out, 
and where the audience ranges from the general public to technical 
discussions held with target groups of stakeholders.  The results from 
such consultations are published within an Impact Assessment report 
alongside the final legislative proposal, and should include an explanation 
as to how consultation influenced the policy choices taken.  As with similar 
instruments in many other contexts, there is predictable scepticism 
among seasoned practitioners as to the extent to which impact 
assessments are responsive to their input, or which simply justify a policy 
choice taken well before formal consultation procedures commenced, and 
in which consultation responses are used as ammunition for ‘divide and 
rule’.  These criticisms can only be scrutinised by examining the 
operational detail of such schemes. 
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All legislative proposals, as well as white papers, action plans, expenditure 
programmes, guidelines which define future policies, and implementing 
measures (other than those which are highly technical and limited in 
impact require an impact assessment   (European Commission, 2009a). 
The guidance manual accompanying production of IAs reveals a highly 
detailed process requiring the production of a report with seven sections 
providing details of: consultation undertaken with interested parties; a 
justification of why the problem needs to be resolved at EU level (the 
‘subsidiarity test’); the policy options; an analysis of the economic, 
environmental and social impacts; a comparison of the options; and 
arrangements for monitoring and evaluation (European Commission, 
2009a).   Consultation with stakeholders on impact assessments begins at 
an early stage in the process so as to enable the data generated to inform 
analysis.  The impact analysis section of the guidance manual requires the 
identification of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and sub- sections for analysis of the 
effects upon, inter alia, social inclusion, gender equality, participation and 
governance.  On such matters the guidelines instruct that the consultation 
of NGOs is essential, with the publicly available status of the manual 
ensuring that such standards will be enforced by advocacy organisations.    
The production of an impact assessment report is accompanied by 
mechanisms of support and oversight.   Minutes of the (support) Impact 
Assessment Steering Group (IASG) considering the final report are 
forwarded to an Impact Assessment Board (IAB) for oversight of the 
process undertaken and quality of the report, comprised of Commission 
officials from economic, social and environmental departments.   A Board 
holds a formal hearing, preceded by meetings with the authors of the 
Impact Assessment report.  Boards are empowered to require legislative 
developers to re-start the impact assessment process or re-design 
elements of it (European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 
2010), and the final report is required to include details of how the 
proposers made changes to the report following the Board’s comment.  A 
positive evaluation is required from the IAB before being sent to the 
responsible Commissioner to consider if a legislative proposal is necessary 
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and what form the instrument might take, and before any proposal enters 
into inter-service consultation within the Commission. The scrutiny of the 
quality of each Impact Assessment is published online, and includes the 
assurance of conformity with consultation standards developed in 2002.  
The work of IABs is in turn subject to scrutiny by the Court of Auditors, as 
well as an increasingly active oversight role exercised by European 
Parliament Committees.  Together, these procedures ensure thorough 
consideration of policy options based on informed analysis and public 
reasoning of alternatives.   
A Strategic Review in 2008 involving public consultation on the IA process 
resulted in changes involving: reinforcement of feedback mechanisms and 
the importance of seeking alternative approaches from NGOs; improving 
the assessment of social impacts; impacts upon SMEs as compared to 
large firms; greater quantification of impacts; and greater use of external 
expertise to validate methodologies, pluralise expertise, and provide 
independent assessments (European Commission 2008; 2009b).  Annual 
reports on the impact assessment process include examples of the ways in 
which legislative proposals have been halted or downgraded as a result of 
conducting IAs, together with scrutiny from IABs.  Over one-third of 
reports required resubmission during 2011, and 41% of reports required 
substantial changes (European Commission, 2012b).   
The IA regime seems to have grown in depth, surrounded by procedures 
progressively developed to strengthen the system.   The use of IAs in 
practice has been extended far beyond circumstances for which they are 
required, and in comparison to systems adopted in the member states the 
EU is a clear leader (Jacobs et al, 2008).  The operational politics do not 
suggest a symbolic regime or one ‘hijacked’ by special interests, but 
rather a process which provides an account of how information generated 
during consultation processes is used to arrive at policy choices.   
Consultation 
The consultation regime is defined by a Commission Communication in 
2002  with reference to Amsterdam Treaty Protocol 7, making it an 
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obligation that ‘the Commission should consult widely before proposing 
legislation’ (European Commission, 2002b).  The 2002 reference 
document states that the guiding principle for the Commission is that of ‘a 
voice but not a vote’ for interested parties.    Among the general minimum 
standards is a stipulation that as well as having an opportunity to express 
their opinions, adequate feedback is provided (European Commission, 
2002b).   
There is now a presumption towards public consultation prior to more 
specialised forms of consultation (European Commission, 2009).  Open 
public consultation is used in three quarters of all impact assessments 
(European Commission, 2012c), with 90% of all impact assessments also 
involving targeted stakeholder consultation, often during later stages of 
impact assessment.  The centrepiece of public consultation is a website, 
‘Your Voice in Europe’, in which policy documents are placed and 
responses invited.  A 2012 open public consultation survey on the revision 
of the Tobacco Products Directive attracted a record high of 85,513 
responses.  With such a volume, the impact of an individual response is 
likely to be minimal, such that diversity of responses provides room for 
manoeuvre for political institutions.  Quittkat and Kotzian argued that 
participation in online public consultations by the ‘usual suspects’ in 
Brussels was primarily to be seen to be ‘playing the game’, not expecting 
that their contribution would make very much impact due to the relatively 
large number of other voices, but hoping to get access to, or a role in, the 
second tier of focused (non-public) consultations (Quittkat and Kotzian, 
2011).   
Consultations focused on target audiences are an instrument of choice 
when the issues are of such a technical nature that they are inaccessible 
to a wider lay public.  A browse through the list of open consultations on 
‘Your Voice in Europe’ confirms the largely technical nature of ‘everyday 
policy-making’ in the EU.  Specialist consultative fora can include 
meetings of/with experts (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011), and/or 
stakeholders, in formal and informal, regular and ad-hoc settings.  The 
choice of stakeholders invited to attend informal settings is also vested in 
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the Commission.   In terms of composition, the numbers participating in 
expert fora from civil society is approximately even between producer and 
non-producer interests (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011).  From the 
Commission’s perspective, it is here where stakeholder participants from 
quite different perspectives can engage in interactive discourse, and come 
to understand the variety of constraints to which the Commission is 
subject to in reaching its policy decisions.  They are therefore of 
significant value in helping to build consensus.    
Once a consultation is closed, on-line links are provided to a follow up 
page which is supposed to contain, inter-alia, information about 
consultation responses, a consultation report within the Impact 
Assessment, and the final legislative proposal.  However, there are a 
number of issues with implementation.  Practice in publishing the 
responses received to consultation exercises varies; in 2011, this 
happened in approaching two thirds of all consultations (European 
Commission, 2012c).   Apparently, practice in publishing the reports on 
the consultation exercises themselves is also variable.  A survey in 2008 
by Hüller and Quittkat found that less than 40% of online consultation 
reports were publically available (Hüller and Quittkat 2009; Quittkat, 
2011), despite the inter-institutional agreement of 2003 recording that 
the results of consultations will be made public (Official Journal C321/4 of 
31.12.2003, paragraph 26).   The Commission’s more recent analysis 
states a higher level, with 58% of summary consultation reports published 
in 2011 (European Commission, 2012c).   
In a review of all impact assessments during the first three years of the 
regime, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) was able to trace 
from consultation reports how stakeholder input had made a difference in 
half of all IAs in the sense that it had resulted in a change to the choice of 
the regulatory option or a major change to the final proposal (Renda, in 
Tanasescu 2009, p.217).  Notably, the CEPS study noted how 
stakeholders who had participated in a targeted consultation were more 
likely to assign the outcome as legitimate when compared to participants 
in open public consultations.  The conclusion of the CEPS study is 
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supported by an external evaluation finding that stakeholder involvement 
improved the quality of impact assessments (Jacob et al, 2008).  
Tanasescu therefore concludes that 
‘when consultations are conducted in a timely and correct manner, 
stakeholder input does make a difference and is reflected in the final 
version of the IA Report’ (Tanasescu, 2009, p.223). 
There has been a growing focus over time in Commission procedures with 
input legitimacy in addition to its traditional needs for output legitimacy, 
Taking impact assessment related policies as a whole, a key point is that 
the Commission has led the development of its procedures at some 
inconvenience to itself, in a way which increases its workload, pluralises 
its power by policies geared towards both output and input legitimacy, 
which require it to engage it transparent public explanation for its actions, 
and which enhances the ability of others to monitor it and call it to 
account.  There is no disguising an upward drift in the standards of impact 
assessment related policies as a whole towards those consistent with input 
legitimacy purposes.   
Acquiring and Providing Information: Access to Documents and 
the Transparency Register 
Directive 1049/2001 on Access to Documents addresses information 
asymmetries by making the work of EU institutions, as well as those who 
provide documentation to them, more easily accessible to scrutiny.  It is 
freedom of information measure facilitated by a web searchable register of 
documents, and a very short e-submission form, which allows requesters 
to obtain documents held by the institutions within 15 working days of 
asking for them.   Of 6447 applications made to the European Commission 
in 2011, 80.2% of access requests were granted in full, and in a further 
7.63% of cases partial access was granted; there was a revision of the 
institution's decision in more than half of the cases queried by applicants 
(European Commission, 2012d).  Academics account for around one-
quarter of applications, followed by interest organisations with one-fifth.  
A small number of interest organisations have been disproportionately 
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responsible for generating access to documents requests. A niche NGO 
has been founded (as a branch organisation of a wider network) in order 
to increase usage of the regime by other NGOs, ‘Access Info Europe’.   
The European Ombudsman plays an oversight role, sometimes working in 
common cause with ‘watchdog’ NGOs to expand his territory.  The 2010 
Annual Report records that the service ‘regularly receives complaints from 
the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), which help us to identify 
shortcomings in the EU administration and to advise the EU institutions on 
how to rectify them’ (European Ombudsman Service, 2010).  CEO is a 
Mundo-B tenant which has made considerable use of the measure, using 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) to successfully 
bring cases against the Commission for procedural failures in the access 
to documents regimeii.  The measure – and its enforcement mechanisms – 
has brought a substantial workload to the Commission, but is one of the 
key tools used to empower civil society organisations to play the role of 
accountability agents.  Paradoxically, it runs counter to the concept of 
bureaucratic self interest by empowering watchdogs at the expense of 
political institutions, providing for a considerable increase in their 
workload as well as their accountability.  Yet the over-riding concern with 
democratic legitimacy is evident from both the development and 
implementation of the measure, extending to documentation originating 
with third parties. 
The Transparency Register 
The Transparency Register primarily involves a flow of information in the 
other direction, i.e. from interest organisations to civil society and to EU 
institutions, via self-disclosure in various categories of information in a 
public web database.  The European Commission and European Parliament 
have a set of rules which regulate the behaviour of the lobbied (for 
appointed and elected officials, and those who assist and advise them), 
and lobbyists.  The former are unremarkable, including transparency 
declarations and measures to avoid conflict of interest (or anything likely 
to be perceived as such), and under incremental development.  The main 
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instrument with regulatory effect upon lobbyists is the Transparency 
Register and its associated code of conduct. 
The 2011 Transparency Register merges two preceding schemes; the 
European Parliament's Accredited Lobbyist scheme, based around the 
registration of individuals and dating from 1998, and the European 
Commission's 2008 Register of Interest Representatives (ROIR), based 
upon organisational registration. The Council has yet to join the scheme, 
despite signalling its intention to do so in June 2011. Registration is 
voluntary, but highly incentivised.  The two strongest incentives involve 
the availability of a special access pass to the European Parliament 
building giving some roaming freedom (as opposed to access only for a 
specific meeting), and the possibility that non-registered organisations will 
not be invited to consultations with target groups of stakeholders. 
'Invitations' to join are also given to non-registered organisations at the 
start of meetings with Commission officials.  A lesser incentive relates to 
information flows, allowing registered organisations to opt in to 
consultation alerts for elective topics, but knowledge which can easily be 
acquired elsewhere.  There are currently over 5,500 registrations, 
covering an estimated 75% of business related organisations, and 60% of 
NGOs, which have an address in Belgium (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013). 
However, a number of organisations from across the globe use the 
database as free advertising space rather than having any link to EU 
policy making or implementation; one-third of registrations do not check 
the ‘European box’ when asked to state the different territorial levels of 
interest represented. A major point of criticism is that there is no systemic 
check which prevents upload to a public interface if information is not 
provided, and a limited extent of random checks in specified data fields 
undertaken by the Commission.  This is partly a question of a lack of 
monitoring resources in the institutions, partly a preference to follow the 
logic of a mutual system of checks and balances among those registered, 
and partly because the Secretariat General of the Commission sees checks 
on every entry as an accreditation scheme linked to arrangements for elite 
access. The result is that the quality of data in the register is somewhat 
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variable, though gradually improving. In practice, the scheme relies upon 
interest organisations monitoring the information entered by others and 
filing complaints strategically, resulting in a good standard of information 
for the core set of organisations lobbying EU institutions. The reputational 
consequences for transgressing organisations can potentially be significant 
where a punishment involves suspension from the register, particularly in 
the case of commercial public affairs consultancies where a loss of client 
base will follow.   
Of particular note is the wide embrace of the Transparency Register, 
covering formal organisations and structures with no legal personality, 
and indirect as well as direct means of communicating messages to EU 
institutions.  An organisation cannot claim to be covered by ‘indirect 
registration’, i.e. through its affiliation to another entity which is 
registered.  Those embraced are asked to provide public information on: 
who is represented; contact and website information; mission; funding; 
lobbying personnel and expenditure. There is some variation of 
information requirements across different categories of actors, with 
questions about lobbying expenditure voluntary for NGOs and compulsory 
for business related organisations.  This contributes to around 15% of 
entries in the NGO segment which would more accurately be categorised 
elsewhere, of which the majority are business associations (such as the 
European Tube Manufacturers Association) or even companies (such as 
Qantas Airways) (Greenwood and Dreger, 2013).  Whilst there is guidance 
on the information to be included, some organisations enter obviously 
implausible data.  Where the Joint Transparency Register Secretariat 
receive a complaint which it subsequently upholds it has a variety of 
options open to it, but most are settled by the offending organisations 
rectifying the data deficit.   
The main gap in the register is that of law firms providing political 
consultancy services. Although they are not large in number, their 
absence carries consequence in that they find a niche in attracting clients 
who do not wish their business to be disclosed, using the cover of ‘client 
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confidentiality’ in professional codes as an excuse not to register.  Many 
think tanks, and churches, were also reluctant to appear in the old (2008) 
Commission Register of Interest Representatives (ROIR) because they 
rejected the label of 'lobbyist' or 'interest representative.' This has been 
resolved by a change of name for the 2011 successor scheme to 
'Transparency Register', within which lies a visible black bold line in the 
presentation of the register which separates producer related interests on 
the one hand, from NGOs, think tanks and research related organisations, 
churches, and public sector entities on the other (de Castro Asarta, 2011).  
It is noticeable that discourse from the Green Paper (European 
Commission, 2006) introducing the ROIR about the ‘legitimacy of 
lobbying’ (de Castro Asarta, 2011) has disappeared completely from the 
Transparency Register.  
Conclusion 
A common driver in any democratically orientated political system is a 
search by political institutions to enhance the legitimacies of its policies; 
interest groups provide a readily available source of supply.  The 
disconnection of trans-national organisations from civil society, and the 
consensual nature of their decision-making, requires interest groups to 
perform roles as surrogate democratic agents.  The twin demands of critic 
and ally seem paradoxical, but ultimately provide political support from 
within systemic parameters.  Transnational organisations have particular 
needs for political supporters and messengers to achieve their policies, 
engaging with resistance from entrenched interests and by lobbying 
governments.  Transnational organisations therefore develop key 
frameworks for groups to operate in, through funding and regulatory 
infrastructure.  The EU has chosen a pluralist design centred upon a 
teeming population of interest groups, requiring a high degree of funding 
for NGOs.  The predominance of regulatory policy making among EU 
competencies results in underlying interest group politics, centred on 
interactions often highly technical in content.  Nonetheless, a feature of 
recent years has been the growth of political contestation by interest 
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groups, and the presence of professionalised social movements bridging 
‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ tactics. The European Parliament, ever keen to 
make its mark, has increased the political content of technical regulation 
as a result of its now virtually complete powers as dual legislator. 
The European Commission has developed an elaborated framework for 
groups to act as checks and balances, both upon each-other and upon 
political institutions.  Extensive procedures have been developed for 
exchanges between political institutions (mainly involving the 
Commission) and interest organisations aimed at acquiring legitimacy for 
this dialogue.  These procedures are of particular importance because of a 
high degree of systemic reliance upon interest organisations by EU 
political institutions.  Centrepiece is impact assessment procedures in 
which consultation is an embedded component, as well as transparency 
measures. These, coupled with transparency measures, belie an emphasis 
upon seeking to develop mechanisms of political consultation in a public 
space, and seeking to moderate the potential for ‘negative externalities’ 
from a dialogue with ‘lobbyists’ – a term the European Commission 
prefers to replace with ‘interest representation’ as a frame to 
communicate what the EU seeks from the dialogue.  Procedures to 
structure interactions with interest organisations have largely been 
developed since 2001, and compare favourably with instruments – where 
these exist – in the member states.  
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